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EXAMINING RESOURCES AND COMPETENCIES VIEW AGAINST TRANSACTIONAL COSTS APPROACH IN 
THE FRENCH POULTRY INDUSTRY: TREADING UPON EGGS
INTRODUCTION 
    Determinants of firm boundaries have undergone careful examination in the last 40 years, 
and empirical evidence for and against explanations rooted in different theories has been 
accumulating   rapidly,   resulting   in   heterogeneous   results.   Despite   the   multiplicity   of 
approaches   tested   (i.e.   transaction   cost   approach,   resource   based   view,   real   options 
perspective, inter-organizational coordination perspective and so forth); approaches affiliated 
to knowledge and resources, and transaction cost remain clearly the two leading competitors. 
While Transaction Cost Approach (henceforth TCA) provides direct insights into vertical 
integration decisions, Resources and Competencies View (henceforth RCV)  started as a 
competitive advantage approach, with an “economic” orientation focusing on the type of 
resources and competencies that could offer a sustainable competitive advantage to its owner 
over its competitors. Yet, RCV has rapidly extended its interest to the firm boundary 
decisions. In that last field, it immediately emerged as an important competitor to the already 
well-established   TCA,   offering   an   alternative   answer   to   the   transactional   framework, 
criticizing its basic foundations: unit of analysis focusing on transaction, priority given to the 
role of opportunism (Kogut and Zander, 1996, Conner and Prahalad, 1999), as well as cost 
minimization quest logic (Zajac and Olsen, 1993, Heiman and Nickerson, 2002).
Since then, several empirical researches confronted these two approaches (Argyres, 1996, 
Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Leiblein Miller, 2003, Hoetker, 2005, Jacobides and Hitt, 2005, 
Parmigiani, 2007 and so forth). While the majority of studies attempt to proclaim about the 
global dominance of one over the others, authors such as Conner (1991:143)
1 believe that 
there is in fact no reason why there cannot be a “contextuality” of their dominance. Indeed, 
1  “Empirically, there is no reason why it might not be observed that some integration decision seem to turn on 
specific asset creation/ redeployment issues, and others on reducing opportunistic potential. A fruiteful area for 
further theory development may be exploration of situations in which integration decisions can be expected to 
depend on one or the other of this consideration, or a combination ».
1contextual variables can probably influence the relevance of an approach over another in a 
particular context, thus explaining disparity of results among empirical studies. Following this 
standpoint, Steensma and Corley (2001) building on Chiles and Mc Mackin (1996) for 
example, demonstrated how managers’ risk aversion can sharpen TCA’s relevance. They also 
showed that the resource-based rationale, grounded on the opportunity to develop sustainable 
advantages play a larger role when a firm has lower levels of recoverable slacks and risk-
seeking orientation. Argyres (1996) also showed how a capability issue is likely to appear 
most   when   there   is   little   or   very   significant   overlap   between   the   bases   of   generic 
technological knowledge related to activity performance. 
This article aims at testing the degree of empirical support to the resources and competencies 
view as compared to the transactional approach. Therefore, our model addresses the degree to 
which each of these perspectives explains firm boundaries through a set of predictions 
declined from the main conceptual and empirical literature. Results are based on a research 
conducted in the French poultry industry from 2003 to 2006. Data was developed through a 
series of interviews with chief executives in the 14 leading companies, constituting the quasi 
total population, as the latter represent 96% of the total volume produced in France. For each 
company studied, we tested whether TCT or RCV was more relevant in explaining the degree 
of vertical integration in the two primary stages of the poultry production chain that are 
hatchering and feed production. Quantitative tests undertaken through SPSS studied the 
correlation between these two variables. The paper proceeds as follows. A first section 
discusses the two competing approaches, building predictions that emerge from main 
conceptual and empirical literature and mainly focusing on the under-developed RCV’s 
conceptualization. The second section introduces data, sector and method used. It also 
highlights what we call a “temporality” problem that has led us to use a method based on 
interviews. Finally, the last section presents our findings and discussion. 
1.     DETERMINANTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION: CONCEPTUALIZING TCA     
AND RCV.
PREDICTING THE DEGREE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION  THROUGHOUT 
TRANSACTIONAL LENSES  
2Transactional   approach   represents   a   highly   discussed   approach   that   has   imposed   its 
domination through conceptual as well as empirical literature. As emphasized by David and 
Han (2004), since the publication of Williamson's 1975 and 1985 books, starting from the 
early 1990s, TCA has been cited between 250 to 500 citations yearly, and, empirically tested 
across several business fields (Boerner and Macher, 2002). Because exhaustive theoretical 
developments of the TCA can be found elsewhere (Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991), we only 
provide a compact version here, highlighting the main predictions that are tested.  
The basic insight of TCE is to recognize that in a world of positive transaction costs (Coase, 
1937), exchange agreements must be governed, and that, contingent on the transactions to be 
organized, some forms of governance are better than others. Therefore, Williamson (1979, 1985) 
offers a parameterization of the tautological “transaction cost” concept (Fisher, 1977:22)
2. He 
first sets two main hypotheses relative to limited rationality and opportunistic human 
behaviour that increases ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Hence, individuals are limited 
in their ability to plan for the future and these limits are sharpened by the high propensity of 
actors to behave opportunistically (Williamson 1979:234)
3. Then, he identifies three critical 
dimensions with respect to which transaction costs differ: specificity,  uncertainty and 
frequency. Simultaneously, Williamson categorizes generic forms that are supported by 
different contract laws. His model is rooted in Macneil’s (1974, 1978) contract typology 
which  advances  three  contractual  classifications:  classical (market  form),   neo-classical 
(hybrid form) and relational contracts (Bilateral or unified). The last step of the reasoning 
connects transaction costs with modes of organization. He links the two pieces through what 
he calls the “discrete alignment” principle. Concretely,  the arbitration between the three 
generic forms is based on a transaction costs minimization quest, called “economizing” where 
each generic form is a syndrome of transaction attributes.
This framework provides a set of testable propositions concerning the degree of vertical 
integration. In fact, Williamson (1979) argues that vertical integration will be relatively more 
efficient with recurrent transactions, and when investments are idiosyncratic (high asset 
specificity) and uncertainty is either high or medium. Indeed, vertical integration results from 
the need to prevent ex-post hold-up problems, resulting from transaction specific investments. 
2 « Transaction costs have a well deserved bad name as a theoretical device...[partly] because there is suspicion 
that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified transaction costs”.
3 « Even among the less opportunistic most have their price ».
3These predictions have been extensively operationalized with an emphasis on “positive” 
rather than on “normative” analysis (Masten, 1993, Poppo and Zenger, 1998). In effect, the 
majority of empirical research stress the variation of the discriminating alignment hypothesis 
identified above, where organizational mode is the dependent variable, while transactional 
properties, as well as other control variables, serve as independent variables. Aiming to assess 
the most achieved framework, a deep reading of the main conceptual and empirical literature 
showed that frequency is rarely tested, whereas specificity, uncertainty and the effect of 
opportunism   on   the   degree   of   vertical   integration   are   the   three   leading   dimensions 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In the following sections, we will briefly present the main 
transactional predictions. 
ASSET SPECIFICITY 
Specificity of assets is the cornerstone of the transactional approach. It has been defined as the 
value of investments that would be lost in any alternative use (Williamson, 1985). In fact, 
highly specific assets create mutual dependence that opens the possibility of “hold-up”, 
defined as the detrimental ex-post appropriation of the quasi-rent by one or some partner(s) 
(Klein & al., 1978). Following Williamson’s logic, the first prediction is set as follows:  
Prediction 1: The greater the degree of specificity, the more likely a firm is to select a 
higher degree of vertical integration.  
This prediction can be declined into different types of specificity including physical assets, 
human assets and site specificity. 
Prediction 1a: The greater the degree of physical assets specificity, the more likely a firm 
is to select a higher degree of vertical integration.
Prediction 1b: The greater the degree of human assets specificity, the more likely a firm 
is to select a higher degree of vertical integration.
Prediction 1c: The greater the degree of site specificity, the more likely a firm is to select 
a higher degree of vertical integration.
OPPORTUNISM
Opportunism  is   the   assumption   that,   given   the   opportunity,   decision   makers   may 
unscrupulously seek to serve their self interest, and that is difficult to determine a priori who 
4is trustworthy and who is not. This risk increases facing small number situations, where 
“replaceability” problems are sharpened. This gives rise to our second prediction: 
Prediction 2: The greater the degree of opportunism surrounding a transaction, the more 
likely a firm is to select a higher degree of vertical integration. 
UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainties surrounding the organization of a transaction may also involve significant costs, 
whether it comes out of agents’ behaviour or organizational deficiencies; or from inadequate 
institutions. Uncertainty is therefore an external “disturbance” that can generate opportunistic 
behaviour, as changes can lead to difficulties with modifying agreements to changing 
circumstances. While empirical studies do not automatically take into account the importance 
of linking uncertainty to specificity (Slater and Spender, 2002, David and Han, 2004, Klein, 
2004), Williamson clearly points out the important role of uncertainty only once it deals with 
specific assets. The following prediction underlines the importance of combining uncertainty 
to specificity. 
Prediction 3: The greater the asset specificity and the greater the uncertainty surrounding 
a transaction, the greater is the likelihood of the firm to select a higher 
degree of vertical integration.
This  prediction has then been declined into two main types of uncertainty including 
environmental unpredictability and behavioural uncertainty. While the former refers to 
unpredictability due to fluctuation of factors such as demand, price or technology, the latter 
refers  to   a performance  evaluation  problem,  that  is,  difficulties   in  verifying  whether 
compliance with established agreements can be easily verified. 
Prediction 3a:  The greater the asset specificity and the greater the environmental 
uncertainty surrounding a transaction, the greater is the likelihood of the 
firm to select a higher degree of vertical integration.
Prediction   3b:  The  greater   the   asset   specificity   and   the   greater   the   behavioural 
uncertainty surrounding a transaction, the greater is the likelihood of the 
firm to select a higher degree of vertical integration.
5PREDICTING THE DEGREE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION THROUGHOUT 
RESOURCES AND COMPETENCIES LENSES  
Mid-eighties witnessed the emergence of a growing body of work collectively labelled the 
resource and capability-based view of the firm
4. In reality, RCV first adopted an “economic” 
orientation. Pioneer studies (Wernerfelt, 1984
5, Barney, 1986, 1991, Dierickx and Cool, 1989, 
Peteraf, 1993) focused on the type of resources and competencies that could offer to its owner 
a sustainable competitive advantage. Therefore, resources and competencies approach first 
appeared as a theory of competitive advantage or a theory of “performance of the firm” 
(Argyres & Zenger, 2007). Issues were mainly concerned with putting in place resources and 
competences that offer a sustained competitive advantage; as well as resources that provide 
greater value. 
This section aims to focus  on RCV’s insights into vertical integration decisions. As, no 
universal framework is available through literature; we will proceed by putting in light 
conceptual studies that seem to offer fruitful foundations, as well as the most tested 
predictions across empirical studies. Concepts such as competencies, core competencies, 
dynamic competencies, knowledge, as well as routines have been progressively integrating. 
The following table reviews branches that compose RCV (Koeing, 1999). For each, we 
extract general predictions that emerge, and then, suggest predictions that could directly be 
applied to the “make or buy” decision. 
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4 In reality, RCV draws inspiration from Edith Penrose’s (1959) influential book On the Theory of Growth of the 
Firm (1959). Conceptual article such as Wernerfelt’s 1984 and Barney’s 1986, clearly pointed out the existence 
of a new approach. However, empirical tests only took form from the early nineties. 
5 His article won the Strategic Management Journal “Best Paper” reward.
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RELATIVE TO “MAKE 
OR BUY” DECISION
-   Verify   whether 
activities that rely on 
resources   possessing 
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help   to   obtain   a 
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advantage ;
-Then,   verify   whether 
these   activities   are 
integrated
7 or not.
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activities   for   which 
they   possess   core 
competencies.








No   clear 
predictions 
can   be 
declined. 
This brief review  shows a disparity among units of analysis, as well as tautological 
predictions (Priem and Butler, 2001) based upon concepts that are also difficult to observe 
(Godfrey and Hill, 1995). Moreover, among this set of predictions, none does explicitly make 
reference to the “make or buy” decision. However, the main idea that appears from these 
branches is that vertical integration should concern activities that can offer greater value to the 
firm. 
STRATEGIC ASPECT OF AN ACTIVITY 
The above branches point out the importance of internalizing activities for which it possesses 
resources, core or dynamic competencies that offer a sustained competitive advantage. In 
other words, vertical integration should concern strategic activities. This argument is also 
underlined by Zajac & Olsen (1993) and Gosh & John (1999) throughout the “strategizing” 
concept. This leads to a first prediction emerging from the “competitive advantage” branches. 
Prediction 4: The more strategic the activity is perceived the more likely it will be integrated
Further review of firm boundary’s conceptual studies emphasizes three recurrent dimensions 
that offer other fruitful foundations to the RCV’s framework. 
DIFFERENTIAL CAPABILITIES 
6 Ressources valorisables, rares, non imitables et non substituables. 
7 This prediction is extracted from Steensma et Corley (2001)’s article in which RBV is tested  throughout these 
two propositions..
7RCV featuring as a “theory of the firm” first appeared as an alternative answer to the 
transactional approach framework, criticizing its basic foundations: unit of analysis focusing 
on transaction, priority given to the role of opportunism (Conner and Prahalad 1996), as well 
as cost minimization quest (Heiman and Nickerson 2002). Indeed, some of the impetus behind 
the development of competence-based theories stems from dissatisfaction with exclusively 
transaction cost explanations. According to Hodgson (1998), it is this debate undertaken 
through the successive articles published in the Organization Science in 1996 (Kogut and 
Zander, 1996, Foss 1996) that transformed RCV into an alternative “theory of the firm”. 
Earlier, scholars such as Demseltz (1988: 147)
8 or even Richardon (1972) had already pointed 
out the importance of boundary explanations encapsulating concepts such as know-how and 
capabilities. In fact, the main contend of RCV as a theory of the firm is that the reason an 
activity is conducted within a firm is not necessarily market failure but rather firm success, 
since it manages to put in place “a higher order of organizing principles”. Therefore, internal 
structures can become a “creator of positive” rather than an “avoider of negative” (Kogut and 
Zander, 1996). Nonaka & Al. (2000) argue that internal interactions among members result in 
a   rapid   coordination   that   can   enhance   internal   know-how   as   well   as   skills   transfer; 
emphasizing that the “ba” (firm) is a place where an individual transcend him/herself through 
an amplified knowledge creation. 
Following that standpoint, vertical integration decisions should result from a capability 
comparative logic. Since firms differ in their ability to undertake an activity, the former 
should integrate activities for which they possess superior capabilities. This argument leads to 
the second following prediction:
Prediction 5: Firms will vertically integrate into those activities in which they have greater 
production experience and/or organizational skills than potential suppliers.
COMPLEMENTARITIES
8 “The emphasis that has been given to transaction costs dims our view of the full picture by implicitly assuming 
that all firms can produce goods and services equally well…Since firms may not be perfect substitutes in the 
production of goods and services, it might be of interest to the firm to produce its own input event if the 
transaction costs were zero and management costs were positive. Or, if the production cost incurred by other 
firms is sufficiently low, it might serve the firm to purchase its inputs, even though the costs of managing “in-
house” production is zero”.   
8In her article comparing RBV to industrial economics, Conner (1991) offers important 
insights into boundary decisions. She stresses the fact that heterogeneity among firms can 
explain different performances among firms. Therefore, a given asset can be more efficiently 
combined within a firm X than another firm Y since the former already possesses a stock of 
complementary resources. In fact integrating complementary assets offers synergies that 
emerge from “co-specialization”. Firms can therefore integrate because of assets “reladness”. 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) follow the same standpoint, putting in light the importance of 
“interconnectedness”, arguing that firms will therefore integrate activities for which they 
already possess a “stock” of assets, termed “assets mass efficiencies”. Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt (1988) also underlined the role of complementary throughout what they termed 
« super-additive » assets. This argument gives rise to the following prediction :
Prediction 6: The greater an activity is perceived as complementary to firm’s assets the more 
likely it will be integrated.
INTERDEPENDENCIES
Conceptual literature relative to RCV’s insights to boundary decisions also shows the 
important role played by interdependence. Indeed, Grant (1996) highlights the importance of 
interdependence in determining whether an activity should be integrated or not. He argues 
(1996:114)   that   “Knowledge-based   view   of   the   firm   encourages   us   to   perceive 
interdependence as an element of organizational design and the subject of managerial 
choice”. Building on the earlier Demseltz (1991)
9, he argues that if markets transfer 
knowledge inefficiently, vertical adjacent stages of production A and B will be integrated 
within the same firm if production at stage B requires access to the knowledge utilized in 
stage A. If, on the other hand, the outside A can be processed at stage B without the need to 
access the knowledge utilized at stage A, then A and B are efficiently conducted by separate 
firms linked by market interface. This argument leads to our last prediction: 
Prediction 7: The greater an activity is perceived as interdependent considered, the more 
likely it will be integrated.
9 Demseltz H., (1991), The Theory of the Firm Revisited, In O. Williamson (eds.), The Nature of the Firm, 
Oxford University Press, NY, pp. 159-178. 
9So as to make sure of the completeness of the outlined predictions, we have undertaken an 
empirical review. For each research considered, we controlled whether the model tested is 
included in the four predictions presented above. The following table synthesizes this survey, 
classifying empirical studies depending on the methodology used (qualitative vs quantitative 
and positive vs normative), as well as the branches on which it is based. 
Table 2: Synthesis     of RCV’s predictions in the empirical literature    
METHODOLOGY USED TEST OF RCV
Qualitative   Positive  KBV -  Comparison   between   firm   and   supplier’s   capabilities 
(Argyres, 1996).
Normative                                                          ×
NO STUDIES FOUND
Quantitative   Normativ
e       
KBV
RBV
-   Effect   of   increased   specificity   on   firm’s   governance 
performance. (Poppo & Zenger, 1998).
- Relationship between integration and improvement of the 
competitive positioning (Kale & Puranam, 1994)
- Relationship between uniqueness-imitation barriers and 
sustained   competitive   advantage  (Steensma   &   Corley, 
2000: first and second hypothesis).








-  Effect   of   transferability   (measured   by   codifiabilty, 
teachability, complexity, number of previous transfers   and 
age of the technology) on the technological mode of transfert 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992).
-  Effect of the perceived contribution of the activity to a 
compettitive advantage and vertical integration  (Steensma 
&  Corley,   2001;   Schilling   &   Steensma,   2002 :  third 
hypothesis).
-  Effect of « Strategic aspect » of an activity on vertical 
integration (Delmond, 1994).
- Comparison between firm and suppliers’s capabilities and 
vertical integration (Leiblein and Miller, 2003, Jacobides 
& Hitt, 2005, Hoetker 2005, Parmigiani, 2007). 
The foundation of any theory of the firm is a set of initial premises which form the basis for 
the   logical   development   of   propositions   concerning   the   structure   of   the   firm.   These 
foundations are still heterogeneous in RCV approach. Even though several empirical studies 
exist, there still is no consensus about the propositions to be tested. As related by Jacobides 
and Hitt (2005), two main traditions dominate; the first focuses on competitive advantage, 
while the second focuses on comparative advantage. We can also notice that complementarity 
and interdependence that emerge from conceptual literature have not been tested. 
102.     METHODS    
PRESENTATION OF THE FRENCH POULTRY INDUSTRY 
The above predictions were tested on survey data from the French poultry industry. We 
selected one industry rather than several in order to detect real differences in practice that 
might otherwise be confound with industry-specific effects. 
The choice of this particular sector results from two main reasons. First, it offers different 
stages constituting the whole production chain that is represented as follows: Hatching eggs 
are transformed into hatching baby chicks through a selection and incubation process, once 
the baby chicks produced; they are transported to growers (raising farmers). In parallel, a feed 
mill mixing ratios for raising chicks is operated by the feed producers. Growers then feed 
animals for a seven week period time (in average) for standard chicken
10. Finally, chicken are 
slaughtered and processed so as to be distributed (see figure 1). Despite the same transactional 
context, these activities are not undertaken similarly among different operators. Indeed, while 
the leader,  LDC  relies upon contracts, his challenger,  DOUX  wholly integrates  these 
activities
11. Second, this sector has also been chosen as, even though theories of the firm have 
been tested in many sectors
12, it appears that aviculture remains poorly studied. Interesting 
studies do exist (Knoeber, 1989, Allen & Lueck, 1993, Ménard 1996), however, they focus on 
the sole relationship between integrators and producers (raising farmers), notwithstanding 
integration decisions within other activities constituting the poultry chain. Moreover, these 
studies are exclusively based upon primary data, neglecting operators’ beliefs and perceptions 
that influence boundaries decisions. 
Figure 1: Representation of t    he poultry chain     
10 An eleven week period is required for certified chicken
11 In exception of the raising activity. In fact, the group orders chicken to the farmers (growers) who become
nearly “integrated to the group”, as the former provides them with chicks, animal feeding and technical support 
that are free of charge. The breeder is paid an amount called a “façon”, once the animal delivered.
12
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Processors DistributorsFrench aviculture is leading the European production, and is second in world exports
13. It 
remained  for a long time organized in a traditional way and the first symptoms  of 
industrialization only appeared in 1950 (Diry, 1985). Since then, the industrial operators 
usually called “integrators” started holding an increasing role in the sector. Nowadays, the 
sector is concentrated and twenty two companies (see Annexe 1) account for the whole 
volume of production. 
These companies are composed of private groups and agricultural cooperatives. Private 
groups were at the beginning generally
14 slaughterers that decided (or not) to integrate upward 
activities, whereas cooperatives
15 started to be involved with upward activities, dealing with 
the combination of “feeding and growing” activities, and then decided whether to downward 
integrate slaughtering and distributing activities or not
16.  In most cases, private groups are 
directly in contact with the distribution channel (i.e. Carrefour, Géant, Monoprix...), which 
orders products with technical and sanitary requirements. Starting from that order, these 
private groups organize their own production chain (if they are integrated), or, buy through 
spot market or contracts with farmers, incubators, and feed producers. They can also contract 
with a single entity which already masters the entire production chain. However, variants do 
exist, and while slaughterers can be more or less integrated, cooperatives can also integrate 
the slaughtering activity being therefore directly in contact with the distribution channel. 
13
1
 For more details see Ménard (1996). 
14
1
 One exception exists as the private group “Arrivé”, started as a feeder, and extended progressively its activities, 
integrating the other activities of the production chain. 
15
1
 A cooperative is a combination of members that own it. In fact, to become a member, farmers must pay an 
“entry ticket” transforming the member in a sort of “stockholder” of the cooperative. The cooperative holds 
property rights on the brand name and is responsible for controlling quality, and, the respect by all parties of the 
requirements contractually agreed upon. It is in charge of marketing the products and of contract negotiations 
with retailers. Consequently, members will not negotiate buying and selling prices individually, as the 
cooperative will be the single negotiator. 
16  In fact, cooperatives never own breeding buildings, they define technical requirements to their members 
through a document the “cahier des charges” (it sets a list of technical and sanitary requirements), provide them 
with technical support, collect and select the products, and take care of the packaging of their members. 
12Hence, these two types tend to be organized in the same way, each of them being more and 
more involved in the upward and downward activities; we decided to study both types. 
Among the twenty two companies studied, further analysis revealed that the eight lastly 
ranked groups are in reality “pure slaughterers” that are not at all involved in upward 
activities (neither hatchering nor feed production). They contract with a unique “production 
entity” that takes in charge the whole production chain. For the latter, as we can not gather the 
same nature of data
17, we decided to exclude them from the study, focusing on the 14 first 
groups that account for 96% of the total production. 
Finally, following Zott and Amit (2006), we decided to focus on the internalization of an 
activity as a whole, rather than on a single product as it is often the case within empirical tests 
(Monteverde and Teece 1982, Walker and Weber 1984). The survey studied two activities 
that are hatchering and feed production who were not chosen at random, but rather based on 
the fact that they were heterogeneously integrated within French poultry groups.
METHODOLOGY AND TEMPORALITY ISSUE 
This study follows the positive tradition, as it tests the degree of confirmation of theories’ 
predictions (Friedman, 1953). Therefore it is based upon a classical questionnaire measuring 
at one hand the degree of vertical integration throughout the two activities, and on the second 
hand the perceived context at the moment of the decision. Questionnaires were directly filled 
out during the interviews which were either conducted directly or through telephone meeting. 
Conceptual items were measured on a five point Likert-scale ranging from “completely 
disagree” to “completely agree”. 
Data   was   gathered   through   interviews   with   key   informants   that   had   to   meet   the 
“knowledgeability criteria” by being involved in the boundary decision at the time the 
decision was taken either as a chief executive, or as an “upward director”
18. This constraint 
required time to identify the right respondent
19. Data collection first included quantitative 
measures. Then, respondents were asked to discuss the answers given through direct 
17 The informants are not involved in these activities and do not really have an opinion about the degree of 
specificity, uncertainty, differential capabilities and so on…
18 The person in charge of coordinating the whole production chain. 
19In many cases, the present director was not in the company at the moment the decision was taken. In two cases 
we had to meet with persons who had already retired.
13interviews. This data collection method emerged from the need to overpass what we called the 
“temporality problems”
20. In fact, this method helped to make sure data concerned the 
perceived situation at the moment of the decision that led to the present firm boundaries. 
Walker and Poppo (1991) already pointed out the risk of studies simply testing whether 
activities that are performed inside are more specific than those outsourced. They argue that 
this method does not specify the cause of vertical integration since assets could have become 
more specific after their internalization. Even though authors do not make imply the 
temporality problem explicitly, they implicitly highlight a problem due to the different 
moments of the decision-making process. Concretely, consider the following example relative 
to verifying impact of feed production’s differential capability in a group that has already 
integrated this activity. The group asked today will more likely answer that he possesses 
superior capabilities. Hence, it is difficult to imagine the same answer if that group had been 
questioned at the moment the decision was taken. Let’s now consider the example of the same 
integrated group whom we ask if it feels difficulties in evaluating its (internal) supplier. Its 
integrated structure will more probably deliver a negative answer whereas it could have been 
exactly this same difficulty that made it integrate at the moment the decision was taken. These 
two examples demonstrate how a static data collection method can respectively lead to a 
wrong confirmation  of RCV’s predictions  as well as a wrong infirmation  of TCA’s 
predictions. 
This temporality problem is sharpened by “governance inseparabilities” (Argyres and 
Libeskind, 1999) that limit the firm in realigning its governance mode to transition’s 
attributes. Indeed, the governance mode can be linked inseparably to the governance mode of 
another transaction in which the firm is engaged. Consequently, a change in transaction 
attributs will not necessarily result in the firm’s governance mode realignment. More recently, 
Argyres and Zenger (2007: 11) pointed out the need for interpreting boundary decision in a 
dynamic way so as to separate the “origin” of the decision from its “persistence”.  The chosen 
method based on a mix between a questionnaire ad interviews constitutes an answer to 
overpass the problem described above. 
MEASURES
20 Risks inherent to temporality problems have been discussed in  Ghozzi H., « Des difficultés de test de la 
TCT et des précautions à prendre : Illustration du secteur avicole français », 2008, Association Internationale 
du Management Stratégique- Nice, Sophia- Antipolis. 
14Conceptual dimensions were hypothesized to be representable by a pool of items. These latter 
were developed from commonly accepted theoretical definitions that were readapted to 
poultry industry’s specific issues. Measures were then discussed with professors and Phd 
students familiar with that problematic. Finally, the questionnaire was pilot-tested with five 
“upward” directors, met during a professional workshop
21  so as to make sure that the 
vocabulary used reflected as much as possible issues of the present sector. 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION
Dependant variables reflected the degree of vertical integration of each group studied in the 
two activities considered. Groups were asked to determine the percentage of activity 
undertaken through spot market, contractual agreement and vertical integration. For each 
activity, four main options exist: spot market, contractual arrangement, vertical integration, or 
a mixed mode
22 (Parmigiani, 2007), including the use of different modes at a time. 
Empirical survey showed that these different modalities were not used with the same 
intensity. The following table (See table 3) shows that spot market is never used (neither as a 
unique mode nor as a mixed mode), whereas groups use integration, contractual agreements 
or a combination of both. Moreover, while hatchering activity is more often undertaken 
through contractual agreements, feed production is generally fully integrated. 
As the spot market is never used, dependant variable has first been reduced to a binary 
modality. However, the importance of mixed modes including the combination of integration 
and contractual agreements added more complexity to the treatment of the dependant variable. 
Following Monteverde and Teece (1982) who define as “integrated” as when an activity is 
integrated at more than 80%, we reduced dependant variable to a binary modality quoting “0” 
non integrated groups and “1” groups that integrated at least a part of the activity
23. 
Table 3         : G    overnance modes through hatchering and feed production.    
21 The « SPACE », Salon des Productions Animales. 
22 This form has also been qualified as « plural mode » by Bradach and Eccles (1989).
23 Groups studied integrated at least 60% of the activity.
15INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OPERATIONALIZATION
Ten constructs were hypothesized
24 to be represented by a pool of 31 item measures that were 
all measured on a five point Likert-type scale. Measures presented below concern hatchering 
activity; they are duplicated for what concerns feed production. 
Asset Specificity. Williamson stresses essentially the degree of transferability of assets that 
supports a given transaction. However, it appears important to distinguish between at least 
three types of transferabilities: towards another activity, another user (Amit et Zott, 2006), as 
well as transferability of the final output (Brousseau, 1993). Hence, an activity can become 
specific as it is supported by assets that cannot be redeployed to another activity, i.e. 
hatchering equipments cannot easily be used for producing feed or for growing chicks. 
Activity can also become specific as requirements differ from a user to another resulting in 
difficult redeployments towards another user. Finally, specificity can also concern the final 
output, as a product ordered with specific characteristics cannot be easily transferred to 
another group in case of contract suspension. 
Measures relative to specificity are abundant; David and Han (2004) underline at least 27 
measures. Five statements adapted from prior work were included in the survey:  
(i) Your groups orders chick’s with particular characteristics (Chick-spec)
(ii) Hatchering equipements can be used in another activity without loosing their 
value (Spec-eq-hat)
(iii) Your group had to invest with hatcherers (Inv-gp-hat)
(iv)   Hatcherers   needed   to   put   in   place   particular   investments   to   meet   your 
requirements (Inv-eqp-hat)
(v) Modifications undertaken by hatcherers limited them in putting in place a contract 
with another group (Contr-lim-hat)
24  If we take into account the tree types of specificity and the two types of uncertainty.
Hatchering
Total             Frequency
Feed production
Total         Frequency
Three mixed modes Spot market/Contract/ Integration 0 0% 0 0%
Two mixed modes
Spot market/ Contract 0 0% 0 0%
Contract/Integration 5 35,7% 4 28,6%
Spot market/integration 0 0% 0 0%
A unique mode
Spot market 0 0% 0 0%
Contract 8 57,2% 2 14,2%
Integration 1 7,1% 8 57,2%
16Human Specificity.  The two items included in the survey are essentially declined from 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1985) and Klein, Roth, and Frazier (1990). They represent the 
degree to which the activity requires personalized skills. 
(i) Hatcherers need a lot of time to be able to deliver products that meet your own 
requirements (Spec-tim-hat)
(ii) A Hatcherer that has assimilated your way of working could cause important 
damages if he worked with your competitors (Spec-risk-hat)
Site specificity. Two items were included to measure whether the group and its supplier are in 
a “cheek-by-jowl” relationship, leading to a geographical dependence.  
(i) Hatcherers have voluntarily been sited next to your group (Sit-hat)
(ii) Your group has voluntarily been sited next to hatcherers (Sit-gp-hat)
Opportunism. Measures reflect the extent to which the group perceives the supplier as unique 
and difficult to replace. The five items included in the survey are adapted from John and 
Weitz (1989), Heide (1994) and Poppo & Zenger (1998)’s operationalizations of the small 
number situation that sharpens opportunistic behaviour.
(i) Hatcherers are easily replaceable (Replac-hat)
(ii) Hatcherers can easily contract with another group (Oth-cont-hat)
(iii) It is costly to change hatcherer (Cost-chg-hat)
(iv) It takes a lot of time to replace a hatcherer (Tim-replc-hat)
(v) It is costly to modify hatcherers’ contracts (Cost-mod-hat)
Environmental  uncertainty.  This variable was operationalized by asking respondents to 
answer about the perceived unpredictability of chicken demand as well as price volatility of 
each product, respectively chicks delivered by hatchereres and feed product delivered by feed 
producers. We also measured the perceived difficulty of bargaining if disturbances do occur. 
(i) Chicken demand is easy to forecast (Dd-hat)
(ii) Chicks prices’ are  volatile (Pric-Chick)
(iii) If the demand exceeds forecast, it is easy to order a greater volume of chicks 
(Increa-vol-hat)
(iv) If the demand is below forecast it is easy to diminish volumes ordered (Deacr-vol-
hat)
Behavioural uncertainty.  This dimension was operationalized as the degree of difficulty 
associated with assessing partners’ performance. Two main items were included in this 
survey: 
(i) It is easy to evaluate hatcherers’ contribution to the final output (Contrib-hat)
(ii) In case of  inefficient output or sanitary problems, it is easy to determine 
hatcherers’ responsibility (Respons-hat)
17Strategic aspect.  This dimension has fewer operationalizations. Moreover, it appeared 
difficult to put in place measures that are not tautological. Three items aimed at measuring the 
degree to which an activity is perceived to be close to the firm’s core competencies, therefore 
offering value as well as differentiation from competitors. 
(i) Hatcherering activity seems to be a strategic stage of the whole chain (Strat-hat)
(ii) Hatcherering activity seems close to your core competencies (Core-hat)
(iii) Hatchering activity offers to the group a better differentiation from its competitor 
(Differ-hat) 
Differential capabilities. This dimension is the most frequently used when testing knowledge- 
based view. Operationalization is mainly adapted from Argyres (1996), Hoetker (2005) and 
Parmigiani (2007). “Temporality problem” discussed above made us employ the concept of 
“expected superior capabilities” rather than “effective superior capabilities”. Indeed as 
stressed by Argyres and Zenger (2007) and Jocobides and Hitt (2005), a group undertaking an 
activity for the first time can hardly possess superior capabilities. However, we think that a 
group, dissatisfied with the quality of his supplier, expects he can obtain superior capabilities. 
This dimension was measured throughout three items: 
(i) Hatchering is based upon a complex process (Complex-hat)
(ii) You possess (can easily put in place) greater production experience and/or 
organizational skills (i.e., 'capabilities') than potential suppliers (Poss-comp-hat)
(iii) It is  difficult  to  put in  place skills  and  know-how  to undertake 
hatchering activity (Diff-comp-hat)
Complementarity. This measure represented the degree to which the activity is considered to 
be   related   to   other   assets   of   the   firm.   Only   a   few   studies   attempted   to   measure 
complementarity (Steensma and Corley, 2000). We introduce three concepts: 
(i) Hatchering   activity   needs   competencies   that   the   firm   already   possesses 
(Comp-hat)
(ii) Your group owns assets (buildings, transport materiel..) that could be used to 
undertake  hatchering activity (Equip-hat)
(iii) Internalizing  hatchering activity would result in important synergies 
with the other activities of the group (Synerg-hat)
Interdependence. We could not find any empirical study attempting to operationalize this 
concept. We therefore chose two items measuring the degree to which the activity is 
perceived to be linked to the other activities of the group, as well as the difficulty to exchange 
with an external supplier: 
18(i) Changes in Hatchering activity considerably affects  the other activities of the 
group (chg-hat)
(ii) It is easy to coordinate with hatcherers (Coord-hat)
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
TCA and RBV predictions were confronted to a total of 28 vertical integration decisions: 14 
relative to hatchering activity and 14 to feed production. Quantitative method was chosen to 
offer an overview of groups’ perceptions, since a qualitative analysis seemed insufficient to 
deliver global conclusions. Even though the population was narrow for using such a method, 
it remained possible to undertake descriptive statistics over almost the entire population. 
Therefore, descriptive statistics based upon simple regressions undertaken under SPSS 
constituted an appropriate method.
Following Maltz (1993), we compared integrated and non-integrated groups’ perceptions. 
Hence, if predictions are correct, the two groups should differ on the dimensions studied. 
Coefficient of determination R² offered a first representation of the extent to which the studied 
dimension explains the different degrees of vertical integration among the two groups. Then, 
coefficient of regression  β  checked whether the correlation between the two variables 
followed theory’s prediction
25. Finally, as our study relying on descriptive statistics, we had to 
build our own decision rule for classifying the degree of confirmation of the predictions 
tested. The following table clarifies the classification chosen. 
Table 4: Classification citerions 
Seems Inconsistent Seems partly 
inconsistent
Seems partly consistent Seems consistent
25 Studying the only R² was insufficient. Indeed, R² expresses differences between the two groups without 
indicating if the perceived situation is adequate to the prediction or reversed. In fact, an important R² can possess 
a reversed effect, leading to a high contradictory prediction. Therefore, β tells if the groups that integrate have a 
higher (or lower) average perception than those who don’t. 
191) 
All items have R² <10%
2) 
Few items have R² > 
10% but reversed β. 
1)
Items have R²> 10% 
but weak value of R+ 
items with a reversed 
β. 
1)
All items with R²> 10% with a 
weak value of R.
 
2)
R²> 10%  but with a weak 
value + items with R² <10% 
but having no reversed β. 
1)
All R²> 10% with β 
consistent with the 
prediction. Value of R 
must exceed 50%. 
 
Even though this decision rule is limited, it enables to compare global degree of confirmation 
(or infirmation) of the predictions studied. Let us now illustrate this method considering a 
detailed example of physical asset specificity in hachering activity. The present table reports 
for each item, the mean value within groups, standard deviations, R² and β.   Coloured rows 
emphasize items that follow the theory’s prediction.
Table 5: Illustration based e    xample.     
TCT
Hatchering
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This table first shows that mean values between the two groups are quite similar. Two items 
possess an R² superior to 10%. “Inv-equip-hat”  possesses an R² explaining 25% of the 
differences among the two groups. However, the negative coefficient of regression indicates 
that the more hatcherers invest, and the less likely do groups integrate, which is contrary to 
the prediction. “Spec-eq-hat” explains 10,4% of vertical integration variation. However this 
item remains weak as non-integrated group also consider that equipments used for this 
activity are difficult to redeploy towards another activity. Consequently, among the five tested 
items, three possess an R² inferior to 10%, “Inv-eq-hat” shows a reversed relationship, and, 
even though its R² remains weak (10,4%), “Spec-equi-hat” follows theories’ prediction. 
Therefore, it appears that prediction P1A seems to be inconsistent with TCA. 
This same method has been applied for each prediction studied. Results presented in what 
follows only provide aggregated conclusions. 
RESULTS 
20T   ransactional predictions     
TCT confronted to Hatchering activity 
Results reported in table 6 indicate that transaction cost predictions do not explain vertical 
integration variance activity among groups. We can first notice homogeneous perceptions 
whether they are integrated or not. Then, a study of coefficients of determination and 
regression for each item studied shows that predictions seem to be partly inconsistent with 
this approach. Indeed, among the 20 items tested, 15 are inconsistent with the prediction 
(representing 75%); since they do not explain the variation, or show a reversed relationship.
Therefore, as detailed in table 8, 12 items possess a low R² (inferior to 10%) and 3 offer a 
reversed correlation. Even though the five remaining items possess an R² superior to 10%, the 
value of R² remains low, as it is ranges between 10 and 14.9%. As explained above, 
equipments transferability has a weak effect on the degree of vertical integration variance; it 
is also the case for site specificity, supplier’s contribution, cost of contract modification, as 
well as demand volatility. Indeed, even though perceptions do differ, variance is too slight, 
and items tested only weakly predict differences among groups. 
Table     6: TCT confronted to feed production activity    . 
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Oth-cont-hat 2.13 3 0,135 0,154
21P2
1           5 (1.05) (1.15)
Cost-chg-hat































































Table 9 synthesizes the degree of confirmation of the different predictions tested. In fact, none 
seems to be completely consistent with TCA. While specificity and behavioural uncertainty 
are completely inconsistent, opportunism and environmental uncertainty are at least partly 
inconsistent. However, the latter is infirmed as soon as it is combined to specificity.  
Relying on informants’ perceptions, specificity, opportunism and uncertainty do not seem to 
explain different extents of vertical integration as groups show quite similar perceptions 
whether they are integrated or not. Moreover, it is worthy to underline the fact that non-
integrated groups’ perceptions seem to be consistent with their present structure. Indeed, for 
former, assets specificity, uncertainty and opportunism are perceived as low, which can 
explain their non- integrated structure.  
TCT confronted to feed production activity 
Results reported in table 7  also indicate that transaction cost predictions do not explain 
different degrees of vertical integration in feed production activity among groups and neither 
do they in hatchering activity. Indeed, we can notice similar perceptions among groups 
whether they are integrated or not. Then, the study of R² and β for each of the 20 items tested 
in feed production reveals that 18 are inconsistent with the prediction (representing 90%); 
either since they do not explain the variation, or that they show a reversed correlation. 16 
items possess a low R² (below 10%) and 2 are inconsistent with the prediction (see table 8). 
22Non-integrated groups more likely agree with the fact that equipments can be easily used 
within another activity than integrated groups. Indeed, “Spec-eq-fp” explains differences 
among groups at over 23%. Furthermore, price volatility seems explicative of vertical 
integration differences at 26%. Yet, this dimension is annihilated as soon as uncertainty is 
combined with specificity. 
Table 7    : TCT confronted to feed production activity     
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23Table 9 synthesizes the predictions tested, showing that none seem to be consistent with 
TCA’s predictions. Indeed, all the predictions tested are inconsistent or party inconsistent 
with transactional predictions. Environmental specificity is the only prediction that is partly 
consistent with TCA, however it loses its consistency when combined with specificity. 
Informants’ perceptions show that specificity, opportunism and uncertainty do not seem to 
explain the reason why groups integrate this activity at different degrees. Once more, it is 
important to mention that non-integrated groups’ perceptions are consistent with their 
structure. Indeed, assets specificity, uncertainty and opportunism are perceived as low which 
can explain non integrated structure. 
Table 8    : Transactional items within the two activities.     
TCT within hatchering TCT within Food prediction 
Total  items tested 20
Total items rejected
         -      R²<10%
-      β inversé
              15 (75%)
              12 (60%)
                3 (15%)
              18 (90%)
              16 (80%)
                2 (10%)
Total  items confirmed                 5 (25%)                 2 (10%)
Average R² of items with 
R²>10%
              12%               24,8%
Highest R²               14,9%               26%
Table 9    : Transactional predictions consistency within the two activities.      
Predictions Hatchering Feed production
P1a : Asset specificity Seems inconsistent Seems inconsistent
P1b : Human specificity Seems inconsistent Seems inconsistent
P1c : Site specificity Seems partlyinconsistent Seems inconsistent
P2 : Opportunism Seems partly inconsistent Seems inconsistent
P3a : Environnemental uncertainty Seems partly inconsistent Seems partly consistent
*specificity Seems inconsistent Seems inconsistent
P3b : Behavioural uncertainty Seems inconsistent Seems inconsistent
*specificity Seems inconsistent Seems inconsistent
RCV predictions 
RCV confronted to Hatchering activity 
Items representing RCV’s main dimensions seem to offer important insights into vertical 
integration decisions. Among the 11 items tested, only two are eliminated (representing less 
than 20%), and none show a reversed relationship (see table 10 and 12). And, among the 9 
remaining items, 4 possess coefficients of determination that are superior to 30%. 
24Even though the activity isn’t considered as strategic by the two groups, integrated groups 
more likely consider that the activity is included in their core competencies. Furthermore, it is 
worthy to highlight that “poss-comp-hat” accounts for 80% of the variation among groups. 
Therefore, it appears that if groups perceive they can put in place superior capabilities, they 
will increase the use of vertical integration. This item is even more significant than this 
activity seems highly complex and difficult to master
26. Complementarity also plays an 
important role on vertical integration decisions as groups that integrate consider that the 
activity is highly strategic, and this item accounts for nearly half the variation of data (45%). 
Finally, interpendence seems more important for integrated groups, which is consistent with 
Grant’s prediction. 
Table 10:      RCV confronted to hatchering activity.     






















































































Therefore, it clearly appears that even though all items are not completely consistent with 
RCV’s predictions, they are much more consistent in explaining different vertical integration 
among groups than TCA’s items (see table 13). 
It is also important to underline that items that are not highly supported do not explain vertical 
integration variances. However, they are confirmed for non-integrated groups. Indeed, the 
26 These two item constitue meditor variables that influence (increase or decrease) the importance of the role of 
differential capabilities. 
25latter consider that the activity is not strategic; it does not differentiate the group. They also 
consider they do not possess skills and equipment that can be used for this activity. 
RCV confronted to feed production activity 
A detailed analysis shows that among the 11 tested, 5 are eliminated (representing 45%) since 
they possess low R², and no items show a reversed correlation. The six remaining items 
possess R² ranged between 18% and 52% (see table 11and 12). The most significant items are 
relative to the “core competencies” and “synergies” dimensions. 
Table 11:      RCV confronted to feed production activity.     






















































































Among the 4 predictions tested in feed production, 3 seem to be partly consistent whereas one 
is inconsistent. Therefore, even though RCV is more consistent than TCA in explaining 
vertical integration variance in feed production, still, the former is less confirmed than in 
hatchering activity ( See table 13). 
Furthermore, it is important to mention that RCV predictions are more often confirmed for 
non-integrated groups. In fact, the two types of group consider that the activity is not strategic 
and does not differentiate the group from its competitors. Moreover, both consider not 
possessing complementary assets. 
26Table 12    : RCV’s items within the two activities.    
RCV within hatchering  RCV within feed production
Total  items tested 11
Total items rejected
- R²<10%
-      β inversé
               2 (18%)
               2 (18%)
               0  (0%)
               5 (45%)
               5 (45%)
               0  (0%)
Total  items confirmed                9 (82%)                6 (55%)
Average R² of items with 
R²>10%
              29%               33,5%
Highest R²               80,6%               52%
Table 13    : Transactional predictions consistency within the two activities.      
Predictions Hatchering activity Feed production
P4 : Strategic aspect of the activity Partly inconsistent Partly consistent
P5 : Differential capabilities Consistent Partly consistent
P6 : Complementarity Partly consistent Partly consistent
P7 : Interdependence Partly consistent Inconsistent
DISCUSSION 
Results emerging from this study first show that central predictions constituting these 
approaches are not highly confirmed; the highest item explains the variance at 80%, and the 
others between 10% and 53%. Moreover, the simultaneous consistency of predictions related 
to the two approaches suggests that vertical integration decisions are influenced by both 
approaches (Madhok, 2002). Finally, these results put in light a “contingent” empirical 
support for each theory studied. 
Indeed, the two approaches tested are not equally confirmed or infirmed depending on the 
activity considered, and more surprisingly,  according to the degree of vertical integration 
studied. In fact, TCA’s central predictions are less confirmed than RCV’s. On the one hand, 
TCA is slightly more confirmed in hatchering activity than in feed production. Hence, while 
25% of the items are partly consistent with the prediction in hatchering activity, only 10% of 
the former are consistent in feed production. On the other hand, RCV seems to be more 
relevant in hatchering activity than feed production activity, especially for what concerns the 
prediction relative to differential capabilities. This result is sharpened by the fact that 
hatchering activity is more often undertaken under contract (14%) than feed production (57%) 
which confirms TCA more frequently in the latter. This raises the question about the reason 
27explaining the high integration in feed production
27. This first result is unsurprising; Conner 
(1991:143) already stipulated this point:
« Empirically, there is no reason why it might not be observed that some 
integration decision seem to turn on specific asset creation/ redeployment 
issues, and others on reducing opportunistic potential. A fruitful area for 
further   theory   development   may   be   exploration   of   situations   in   which 
integration decisions can be expected to depend on one or the other of these 
considerations, or a combination».  
Moreover, it has also been empirically demonstrated by Argyres (1996). He showed that 
different stage in the production of television cables within a group can be determined by 
factors related either to TCA or to RCV.  
Besides, a second finding also worthy of discussion is that the two approaches are more 
consistent for the non-integrated structure. Thus, these approaches are in fact more relevant in 
explaining non-integration decision, especially TCA. Indeed, it appeared that items that 
predict non-integrations decisions do not manage to take in charge the explanation of 
integration decision; the latter being probably driven by other dimensions. This result follows 
the same standpoint than Parmigiani (2007: 286) which explains that  « The choices that 
motivate the firm toward making may not be the same as those motivating it away from 
buying ». As a result, an approach can be relevant for explaining a particular structure and 
without necessarily providing motivating forces along the whole continuum. 
 
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to provide some substance to the long-standing debate over the dominance 
of the two leading approaches dealing with the “make or buy” decisions. This research has 
therefore put in light the central predictions constituting these approaches, and operationalized 
key dimensions by a pool of items. The model has been tested within the main groups of the 
French poultry industry. Data was collected through a method combining interviews and 
quantitative tests to overpass the “temporality problem”. Results essentially pointed out a 
“contingent” confirmation of these approaches that are not equally confirmed depending on 
the activity considered, and, in regard to the degree of vertical integration considered. 
27 Further test undertaken throughout our Phd thesis shows that this activity is in fact integrated for reasons 
belonging to « Industrial Economics », especially scale and scope economies. 
28Some limitations to this study essentially involve the fragility of the decision rule created, as 
well as the difficult “generalizability” resulting from the sector’s specificities. Moreover, it 
would have been even more interesting to be confronted to situation in which transaction 
costs are high so as to verify whether RCV or TCA’ explanatory power is more important 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Indeed, our study only included empirical situation in which 
transaction costs for the two activities are perceived as relatively low. Therefore, we could not 
analyze the case in which despite high transaction costs, activities could have been outsourced 
for RCV related reasons.  
Still,   this   research   offered   several   contributions.   It   first   reviewed   main   conceptual 
contributions to the “make-or-buy” decision, especially concerning the RCV framework 
which is intriguingly silent when it comes to offering clear parameters (Williamson, 1999, 
Priem and Butler, 2001). Indeed, the multiplicity of existing contributions sharpens the lack of 
a homogenous framework. Our discussion also highlighted the “temporality” problem, 
showing the risk of not taking into account the different times of the decisions when it comes 
to testing theories of the firm. Finally, this research offers an additional empirical test of the 
predictive content of these two approaches. Following the same standpoint than authors that 
believe in the contingency of theories (Steensma and Corley, 2001); we showed that theories 
are not always confirmed or infirmed, but that it depends of the activity as well as the 
structure studied. Therefore, all along the continuum, different theories can take over 
according to the extent of vertical integration studied. This conclusion essentially focusing on 
“contingency” provides an important answer to the heterogeneous empirical results, as each 
author, depending on the characteristics of the activity studied, will see a theory confirmed 
rather than another. We maintain that further research effort should be directed towards 
determining when each perspective may be more or less relevant. 
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APPENDIX     1:     
Groups Legal Statutes  Turnover
 (Million euros)
1. LDC Private group 1,496
2. Doux Private group 1.450
3. Gastronome  Cooperative 799
4. Arrivé Private group 338
5. Tilly Sabco-Socavi Cooperative 304
6. Glon volaille Private group 214
7. Ronsard   Cooperative 126
8. Duc Private group 115
9. Houdebine/RVE Private group 96
10. Les volailles du Périgord Private group 82
11. Volaven  Cooperative 69
12. Ernest Soulard Private group 70
13. Secoué Cooperative 54
14. Savel Private group 47
15. Jean Routhiau Private group 39
16. Volaille Corico Private group 38
17. Siebert Bruno Private group 32
18. Lionor Private group 31
19. Blason D’or Private group 29
20. Gauthier Volabel Private group 28
21. Volvico Private group 25
22. Béziau Private group 23
Reference    : «         Filières avicoles         » (2006)    
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